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The role of Peace building

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Peace building is an activity that aims to *resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the cultural & structural conditions that generate deadly or destructive conflict*. It revolves around developing constructive personal groups, and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national and racial boundaries. This process includes violence prevention, conflict managing, resolution, or transformation and post-conflict reconciliation or trauma healing, i.e., before, during, and after any given case of violence.

As such, peacebuilding is a multi-disciplinary *cross-sector* technique or method which becomes **strategic when it works over the long run and at all levels of society to establish and sustain relationships among people locally and globally thus engendering sustainable peace. Strategic peacebuilding activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution, and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically.**

The included peace building varies depending on the situation and the agent of peace building. Successful peace building activities create an environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconcile opponents; prevent conflict from restarting; integrate civil society, create law, rule of mechanisms; and address underlying structural and societal issues. Researchers and practitioners also increasingly find that peace building is most effective and durable when it relies upon local conceptions of peace and the underlying dynamics which foster or enable conflict.

Of course, the exact definition of peace building varies depending on the actors, with some definitions specifying what activities fall within the scope of peacebuilding or restricting peacebuilding to post-conflict interventions. Even if peacebuilding has remained a largely amorphous concept without clear guidelines or goals, common to all definitions is the agreement that improving security is the central task of peacebuilding. In this sense, peacebuilding includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national, and international levels to address the root causes of violence and ensure civilians have freedom from fear (negative peace), freedom from want (positive peace) and freedom from humiliation before, during, and after violent conflict.

Although many of peace buildings aim overlap with those of peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict, it is a distinct idea. Peacemaking involves stopping an ongoing conflict, whereas peace building happens before a conflict starts or once it ends. Peacemaking events the resumption of fighting following a conflict; it does not address the underlying causes of violence or work to create societal change, as peace building does. Peacekeeping also differs from peace building in that it only occurs after conflict ends, not before it begin. Conflict resolution does not include some components of peace building, such as state building and socioeconomic development.

While some use the term to refer to only post-conflict or post-war contexts, most use the term more broadly to refer to any stage of conflict. Before conflict becomes violent, preventive peace building efforts, such as diplomatic, economic development, social, educational, health, legal and security sector reform programs, address potential sources of instability and violence. This is also termed conflict prevention. Peace building efforts aim to manage, mitigate, resolve and transform central aspects of the conflict through official diplomacy; as well as through civil society peace processes and informal dialogue, negotiation, and mediation. Peace building addresses economic, social and political root causes of violence and fosters reconciliation to prevent the return of structural and direct violence. Peace building efforts aim to change beliefs, attitudes and behaviors to transform the short and long term dynamics between individuals and groups toward a more stable, peaceful coexistence. Peace building is an approach to an entire set of interrelated efforts that support peace.

In 2007, the UN security general Policy Committee defined peace building as follows. Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and sustainable development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.

History of peace building

As World War II ended in the mid-1940s, international initiatives such as the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions and The Marshall Plan consisted of long-term post conflict intervention programs in Europe with which the United States and its allies aimed to rebuild the continent following the destruction of World War II. The focus of these initiatives revolved around a narrative of *peacekeeping* and *peacemaking*.

After several decades saturated in this narrative, in 1975 Norwegian sociologist coined the term "peace building" in his pioneering work "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace building. Peace has a structure differences from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and peacemaking and peace building. The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up, more specifically, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur. Galtung's work emphasized a bottom-up approach that decentralized social and economic structures, amounting to a call for a societal shift from structures of coercion and violence to a culture of peace. He catalyzed a major shift in the post global narrative by emphasizing how political, economic, & social systems need to address the root causes of conflict and support local capacity for peace management and conflict resolution.

Then, as the Cold War and the various phenomena of its fizzling came to a close (e.g. civil wars between Third World countries, Ergonomics, Bringing), American sociologist John Paul Lederach further refined the concept of peacebuilding through several 1990s publications that focus on engaging grassroots, local, NGO, international and other actors to create a sustainable peace process, especially with respect to cases of intractable deadly conflict where he was actively mediating between warring parties. From a political-institutional perspective, he does not advocate the same degree of structural change as Galtung. However, Lederach's influence in the conceptual evolution of peace building still reflects Galtung's original vision for "positive peace" by detailing, categorizing, & expanding upon the sociocultural processes through which we address both direct and structural elements of violent conflict.

Peacebuilding has since expanded to include many different dimensions, such as **disarmament, demobilization and reintegration** and rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society institutions. The concept was popularized in the international community through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*. The report defined post-conflict peacebuilding as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. At the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations began creating a peacebuilding architecture based on Kofi Annan's proposals. The proposal called for three organizations: the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which was founded in 2005; the UN Peacebuilding Fund, founded in 2006; and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, which was created in 2005. These three organizations enable the Secretary-General to coordinate the UN's peacebuilding efforts. National governments' interest in the topic has also increased due to fears that failed states serve as breeding grounds for conflict and extremism and thus threaten international security. Some states have begun to view peacebuilding as a way to demonstrate their relevance. However, peacebuilding activities continue to account for small percentages of states' budgets.

Categorizing approaches to peace building

In a very broad sense, we can distinguish between three primary approaches to peace building, which each correspond to three primary types of peace:

(1) *Negative peace*

(2) *Positive peace*

(3) *justpeace* (Lederach, sometimes spelled "*just peace*"). In turn, these three set of peace correspond *weatherdirectviolence, structural violence* and cultural.

Negative peace

Negative peace refers to the absence of direct or hot violence, which refers to acts that impose immediate harm on a given subject or group. In this sense, *negative peacebuilding* (aimed at negative peace) intentionally focuses on addressing the *direct* factors driving or mitigating harmful conflict. When applying the term "peacebuilding" to this work, there is an explicit attempt by those designing and planning a peacebuilding effort to reduce direct violence.

Positive peace

"Positive peace" refers to the absence of *both direct violence as well as structural violence*. Structural violence refers to the ways that systems & institutions in society cause, reinforce, or perpetuate direct violence. In this sense, "*positive peacebuilding*" (aimed at positive peace) intentionally focuses on address the *indirect* factors driving or mitigating harmful conflict, with an emphasis on engaging institutions, policies, and political-economic conditions as they relate to exploitation and repression.

While Galtung's original & subsequent literature on the concept of positive peace do include references to cultural violence, for encyclopedic purposes it is still useful to reserve its absence for a term that Lederach and others have since

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developed to remedy gaps in understanding that were not sufficiently addressed through scholarly discussion of positive peace until the mid-1990s: the term *justpeace*. In proposing this term, Lederach identified "Three Gaps in Peacebuilding" this term could address: "The Interdependence Gap", "The Justice Gap", and the "Process-Structure Gap".

Just peace Cultural violence

Just peace refers to the absence of all three types of violence enumerated above: **direct, structural, & cultural**. Cultural violence refers to aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence the ways in which direct or structural violence look or feel "right" according to the moral fabric of society. In this sense, "*just peacebuilding*" (aimed at justpeace) intentionally combines the methods of "positive peace building" (as described above) with a special focus on building and transforming sustainable relationships among conflicting sectors & cultures in such a way that promotes more alignment between each culture's *mores* (standards of "right" behavior or conditions) and the extent to which those *mores* are built/equipped to prevent, resolve, and heal patterns of direct and structural violence.

Components of Peace building

The activities included in peace building vary depending on the situation and the agent of peacebuilding. Successful peacebuilding activities create an environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconcile opponents; prevent conflict from restarting; integrate civil society; create rule of law mechanisms; and address underlying structural and societal issues. To accomplish these goals, peacebuilding must address functional structures, emotional conditions and social psychology, social stability, rule of law and ethics, and cultural sensitivities.

Preconflictpeacebuilding interventions aim to prevent the start of violent conflict. These strategies involve a variety of actors and sectors in order to transform the conflict. Even though the definition of peace building includes preconflict interventions, in practice most peacebuilding interventions are post conflict. However, many peacebuilding scholars advocate an increased focus on preconflictpeace building in the future.

There are many different approaches to categorization of forms of peace building among the peace building field's many scholars.

Barnett *et al.* divides post conflict peace building into three dimensions

1. **Stabilizing the post-conflict zone.**
2. **Restoring state institutions.**
3. **Dealing with social and economic issues.** Activities within the first dimension reinforce state stability post-conflict and discourage former combatants from returning to war (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or DDR). Second dimension activities build state capacity to provide basic public goods and increase state legitimacy. Programs in the third dimension build a post-conflict society's ability to manage conflicts peacefully and promote socioeconomic development.

A mixture of locally and internationally focused components is key to building a long-term sustainable peace. Mac Ginty says that while different "indigenous" communities utilize different conflict resolution techniques, most of them share the common characteristics described in the table below. Since indigenous peace building practices arise from local communities, they are tailored to local context and culture in a way that generalized international peace building approaches are not.

Local, customary and traditional

- Respected local figures
- Public dimension
- Storytelling and airing of grievances
- Emphasis on relationships
- Reliance on local resources

International

- Top-down: engages with national elites, not locals
- Exclusive: deals are made behind closed doors
- Technocratic/historical basis: emphasis on 'striking a deal', 'moving on'
- Modeled on corporate culture: reaching a deal, meeting deadlines prioritized over relations
- Relies on external personnel, ideas and material resources

Major organizations supporting peace

Intergovernmental organizations

The United Nations participates in many aspects of peace building, both through the peace building architecture established in 2005-6 and through other agencies.

- Peace building architecture
 - UN Peace building Commission (PBC): intergovernmental advisory body that brings together key actors, gathers resources, advises on strategies for post-conflict peace building and highlights issues that might undermine peace.
 - UN Peace building Fund (PBF): supports peace building activities that directly promote post-conflict stabilization and strengthen state and institutional capacity. PBF funding is either given for a maximum of two years immediately following conflict to jumpstart peace building and recovery needs or given for up to three years to create a more structured peace building process.

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- UN Peace building Support Office (PBSO): supports the Peace building Commission with strategic advice and policy guidance, administers the Peace building Fund and helps the Secretary-General coordinate UN agencies' peace building efforts
 - Other agencies
- Peace building Portal: provides information and develops communication networks in the peace building community to build local, national, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations' capacity

The role: post conflict peace building

UN Development Programme:

1. Conflict prevention
2. Peace building
3. Post conflict recovery

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund focus on the economic and financial aspects of peace building. The World Bank assists in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery by helping rebuild society's socioeconomic framework. The International Monetary Fund deals with post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding by acting to restore assets and production levels

The EU's European Commission describes its peacebuilding activities as conflict prevention and management, and rehabilitation and reconstruction. Conflict prevention and management entails stopping the imminent outbreak of violence and encouraging a broad peace process. Rehabilitation and reconstruction deals with rebuilding the local economy and institutional capacity. The European Commission Conflict Prevention and Peace building 2001-2010 was subjected to a major external evaluation conducted by Aide a la Decisions Economique (ADE) with the European Centre for Development Policy Management which was presented in 2011. The European External Action Service created in 2010 also has a specific Division of Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation.

Governmental organizations

France

- French Ministry of Defense, operations include peacekeeping, political and constitutional processes, democratization, administrative state capacity, technical assistance for public finance and tax policy, and support for independent media
- French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs: supports peace consolidation, including monitoring compliance with arms embargoes, deployment of peacekeeping troops, DDR, and deployment of police and gendarmerie in support of the rule of law
- French Development Agency: focuses on crisis prevention through humanitarian action and development

Germany

- German Federal Foreign Office: assists with conflict resolution and post conflict peacebuilding, including the establishment of stable state structures (rule of law, democracy, human rights, and security) and the creation of the potential for peace within civil society, the media, cultural affairs and education
- German Federal Ministry of Defence deals with the destruction of a country's infrastructure resulting from intrastate conflict, security forces reform, demobilization of combatants, rebuilding the justice system and government structures and preparations for elections
- German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development: addresses economic, social, ecological, and political conditions to help eliminate the structural causes of conflict and promote peaceful conflict management; issues addressed include poverty reduction, pro-poor sustainable economic growth, good governance and democracy

Switzerland

- Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA): following the bill passed by the Swiss Federal Parliament in 2004 which outlined various measures for civil peacebuilding and human rights strengthening, the Human Security Division (HSD) of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has been responsible for implementing measures which serve to promote human security around the world. It is the competence centre for peace, human rights and humanitarian policy, and for Switzerland's migration foreign policy. To this end, the FDFA gets a line of credit to be renewed and approved by Parliament every four years (it was CHF 310 million for the 2012–2016 period.) Its main peacebuilding programmes focus on 1. the African Great Lakes region (Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo), 2. Sudan, South Sudan and the Horn of Africa, 3. West Africa and Sahel, 4. Middle East, 5. Nepal, 6. South Eastern Europe and 7. Colombia.

United Kingdom

- UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office: performs a range of reconstruction activities required in the immediate aftermath of conflict
- UK Ministry of Defenses: deals with long-term activities addressing the underlying causes of conflict and the needs of the people
- UK Department for International Development: works on conflict prevention (short-term activities to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict) and peacebuilding (medium- and long-term actions to address the factors

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underlying violent conflict), including DDR programs; building the public institutions that provide security, transitional justice and reconciliation; and providing basic social services

United States

- United States Department of State: aids post conflict states in establishing the basis for a lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development
- United States Department of Defense: assists with reconstruction, including humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration and media; and stabilization, including security forces, communication skills, humanitarian capabilities and area expertise
- United States Agency for International Development: performs immediate interventions to build momentum in support of the peace process including supporting peace negotiations; building citizen security; promoting reconciliation; and expanding democratic political processes.
- United States Institute of Peace:

Nongovernmental organizations(Alliances)

- Alliance for Peace building: Washington D.C.-based nonprofit that works to prevent and resolve violent conflict through collaboration between government, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations; and to increase awareness of peace building policies and best practices
- Berghof Foundation: Berlin-based independent, non-governmental and non-profit organisation that supports efforts to prevent political and social violence, and to achieve sustainable peace through conflict transformation.
- Catholic Relief Services: Baltimore-based Catholic humanitarian agency that provides emergency relief post-disaster or post-conflict and encourages long-term development through peacebuilding and other activities
- Conscience: Taxes for Peace not War: Organisation in London that promotes peacebuilding as an alternative to military security via a Peace Tax Bill and reform of the £1 billion UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.
- Conciliation Resources: London-based independent organisation working with people in conflict to prevent violence and build peace.
- Crisis Management Initiative: Helsinki-based organization that works to resolve conflict and build sustainable peace by bringing international peacebuilding experts and local leaders together
- Generations for Peace: An Amman-based global non-profit peace-building organization dedicated to sustainable conflict transformation at the grassroots with a focus on youth.
- Women's Development Organisation (WDO) is a Somali non-profit, politically independent, non-governmental organisation, created by women in order to work for peacebuilding and women's rights defense in Somalia.
- Initiatives of Change: global organization dedicated to "building trust across the world's divides" (of culture, nationality, belief, and background), involved in peacebuilding and peace consolidation since 1946 and currently in the Great Lakes area of Africa, Sierra Leone and other areas of conflict.
- International Alert: London-based charity that works with people affected by violent conflict to improve their prospects for peace and helps shape and strength peacebuilding policies and practices
- International Crisis Group: Brussels-based nonprofit that gives advice to governments and intergovernmental organizations on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict
- Interpeace: Geneva-based nonprofit and strategic partner of the United Nations that works to build lasting peace by following five core principles that put people at the center of the peacebuilding process
- Jewish-Palestinian Living Room Dialogue Group: Since 1992 models and supports relationships among adversaries, while creating how-to documentary films. From 2003-2007, with Camp Tawonga brought hundreds of adults and youth from 50 towns in Palestine and Israel to successfully live and communicate together at the Palestinian-Jewish Family Peacemakers Camp Oseh Shalom - Sanea al-Salam
- Peace Direct: London-based charity that provides financial and administrative assistance to grassroots peacebuilding efforts and increases international awareness of both specific projects and grassroots peacebuilding in general;
- Safer world: UK-based independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives;
- Search for Common Ground: international organization founded in 1982 and working in 35 countries that uses evidence-based approaches to transform the way communities deal with conflict towards cooperative solutions;
- Seeds of Peace: New York City-based nonprofit that works to empower youth from areas of conflict by inviting them to an international camp in Maine for leadership training and relationship building;
- United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY Peacebuilders): The Hague-based network of young leaders and youth organizations that facilitates affiliated organizations' peacebuilding efforts through networking, sharing information, research and fundraising
- Tuesday's Children: New York-based organization that brings together teens, ages 15–20, from the New York City area and around the world who share a common bond the loss of a family member due to an act of terrorism. Launched in 2008, Project COMMON BOND has so far helped 308 teenagers from 15 different countries and

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territories turn their experiences losing a loved one to terrorism into positive actions that can help others exposed to similar tragedy. Participants share the vision of the program to “Let Our Past Change the Future.”

- Karuna Center for Peacebuilding: U.S.-based international nonprofit organization that leads training and programs in post-conflict peacebuilding for government, development institutions, civil society organizations, and local communities
- Nonviolent Peace force: Brussels-based nonprofit that promotes and implements unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a tool for reducing violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict

Instituting Peace Building in academics and Research

- Center for Justice and Peacebuilding: academic program at Eastern Mennonite University; promotes peace building, creation care, experiential learning, and cross-cultural engagement; teachings are based on Mennonite Christianity
- Center for Peace building and Development: academic center at American University's School of International Service; promotes cross-cultural development of research and practices in peace education, civic engagement, nonviolent resistance, conflict resolution, religion and peace, and peace building
- Irish Peace Institute: promotes peace and reconciliation in Ireland and works to apply lessons from Ireland's conflict resolution to other conflicts
- Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies: degree-granting institute at the University of Notre Dame; promotes research, education and outreach on the causes of violent conflict and the conditions for sustainable peace
- United States Institute of Peace: non-partisan federal institution that works to prevent or end violent conflict around the world by sponsoring research and using it to inform actions
- University for Peace: international institution of higher education located in Costa Rica; aims to promote peace by engaging in teaching, research, training and dissemination of knowledge necessary for building peace
- Swisspeace: a practice-oriented peace research institute that is associated with the University of Basel, Switzerland; analyzes the causes of violent conflicts and develops strategies for their peaceful transformation.

Role of women in Peace building

Women have traditionally played a limited role in peace building processes even though they often bear the responsibility for providing for their families' basic needs in the aftermath of violent conflict. They are especially likely to be unrepresented or underrepresented in negotiations, political decision-making, upper-level policymaking and senior judicial positions. Many societies' patriarchal cultures prevent them from recognizing the role women can play in peace building. However, many peace building academics and the United Nations have recognized that women play a vital role in securing the three pillars of sustainable peace: economic recovery and reconciliation, social cohesion and development and political legitimacy, security and governance.

At the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General issued a report on women's participation in peace building in 2010. The report outlines the challenges women continue to face in participating in recovery and peace building process and the negative impact this exclusion has on them and societies more broadly. To respond to these challenges, it advocates a comprehensive seven areas action plan covering the seven commitment areas.

1. Mediation
2. Post-conflict planning.
3. Financing
4. Civilian capacity
5. Post-conflict governance
6. Rule of law
7. Economic recovery.

The action plan aims to facilitate progress on the women, peace and security agenda. The monitoring and implementation of this action plan is now being led jointly by the Peacebuilding Support Office and UN Women. In April 2011, the two organizations convened a workshop to ensure that women are included in future post-disaster and post-conflict planning documents. In the same year, the PBF selected seven gender-sensitive peacebuilding projects to receive \$5 million in funding.

Porter discusses the growing role of female leadership in countries prone to war and its impact on peacebuilding. When the book was written, seven countries prone to violent conflict had female heads of state. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia and Michelle Bachelet of Chile were the first female heads of state from their respective countries and President Johnson-Sirleaf was the first female head of state in Africa. Both women utilized their gender to harness "the power of maternal symbolism - the hope that a woman could best close wounds left on their societies by war and dictatorship.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission works in Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the UN Peacebuilding Fund funds projects in Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Uganda. Other UN organizations are working in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq. The World Bank's International Development Association maintains the Trust Fund for East Timor in Timor-Leste. The TFET has assisted reconstruction, community empowerment and local governance in the country.

As part of the War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq, the United States has invested \$104 billion in reconstruction and relief efforts for the two countries. The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund alone received \$21 billion during FY2003

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and FY2004. The money came from the United States Department of State, United States Agency for International Development and the United States Department of Defense and included funding for security, health, education, social welfare, governance, economic growth and humanitarian issues.

Civil society organisations sometimes even are working on Peacebuildingthem. This for example is the case in Kenya, according to the magazine Development and Cooperation. After the election riots in Kenya in 2008, civil society organisations started programmes to avoid similar disasters in the future, for instance the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and peace meetings organised by the church and they supported the National Cohesion and Integration Commission.

Jennifer Hazen contends there are two major debates relating to peace building; the first centre on the role of the liberal democratic model in designing peacebuilding activities and measuring outcomes and the other one questions the role of third-party actors in peacebuilding.

Regarding the debate about the role of the liberal democratic model in peacebuilding, one side contends that liberal democracy is a viable end goal for peacebuilding activities in itself but that the activities implemented to achieve it need to be revised; a rushed transition to democratic elections and market economy can undermine stability and elections held or economic legislation enacted are an inappropriate yardstick for success. Institutional change is necessary and transitions need to be incremental. Another side contends that liberal democracy might be an insufficient or even inappropriate goal for peacebuilding efforts and that the focus must be on a social transformation to develop non-violent mechanisms of conflict resolution regardless of their form.

With regards to the role of third-party actors, David Chandler contends that external support creates dependency and undermines local and domestic politics, thus undermining autonomy and the capacity for self-governance and leaving governments weak and dependent on foreign assistance once the third-party actors depart. Since the logic of peacebuilding relies on building and strengthening institutions to alter societal beliefs and behaviour, success relies on the populations' endorsement of these institutions. Any third party attempt at institution building without genuine domestic support will result in hollow institutions - this can lead to a situation in which democratic institutions are established before domestic politics have developed in a liberal, democratic fashion, and an unstable polity.

SéverineAutesserre offers a different approach, which focuses on the role of everyday practices in peace building. She argue that the foreign peace builders' everyday practices, habits, and narratives strongly influence peace building effectiveness. Autesserre stresses that international peace builders do not fully understand the conflicts they are trying to resolve because they rarely include local leaders in decision making, do not speak the local languages, and do not stay posted long enough to oversee effective change. This leaves decision makers out of touch with the key players in the peace building process.

Jeremy Weinstein challenges the assumption that weak and failing states cannot rebuild themselves. He contends that through the process of autonomous recovery, international peacekeeping missions can be unnecessary for recovery because they assume that conflicts cannot be resolved by the country internally. He describes autonomous recovery as a "process through which countries achieve a lasting peace, a systematic reduction in violence and postwar political and economic development in the absence of international intervention. Through peace and institutions generated by allowing war to run its natural course, autonomous recovery can be viewed as a success. He claims that war leads to peace by allowing the naturally stronger belligerent gain power, rather than a brokered peace deal that leaves two sides still capable of fighting. Secondly he claims that war provides a competition among providers of public goods until one can control a monopoly. He says that war can create an incentive to create institutions at all levels in order to consolidate power and extract resources from the citizens while also giving some power to the citizens depending upon how many the institutions rely on them for tax revenues.

Virginia Fortna of Columbia University, however, holds that peacekeeping interventions actually do substantively matter following the end of a civil war. She claims that selection bias, where opponents point only to failed peacekeeping interventions and do not compare these missions to those situations where interventions do not occur, is partly to blame for criticisms. Fortna says that peacekeeping missions rarely go into easily resolvable situations while they are sent into tougher, more risky post war situations where missions are more likely to fail, and peace agreements are unlikely to be committed to. When all factors of a certain peacekeeping case study are properly considered, Fortna shows that peacekeeping missions do in fact help increase the chances of sustained peace after a civil war.

Implementation

Barnett *et al.* criticizes peace building organizations for undertaking supply-driven rather than demand-driven peace building; they provide the peace building services in which their organization specializes, not necessarily those that the recipient most needs. In addition, he argues that many of their actions are based on organizations precedent rather than empirical analysis of which interventions are and are not effective. More recently, Ben Hillman has criticized international donor efforts to strengthen local governments in the wake of conflict. He argues that international donors typically do not have the knowledge, skills or resources to bring meaningful change to the way post-conflict societies are governed.

Perpetuation of cultural hegemony

Many academics argue that peace building is a manifestation of liberal internationalism and therefore **imposes Western values interference and practices onto other cultures.** Mac Gintystates that although peacebuilding does not project all aspects of Western culture on to the recipient states, it does transmit some of them, including concepts like neoliberalism that the West requires recipients of aid to follow more closely than most Western countries do. Barnett

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also comments that the promotion of liberalization and democratization may undermine the peacebuilding process if security and stable institutions are not pursued concurrently. Richmond has shown how 'liberal peacebuilding' represents a political encounter that may produce a post-liberal form of peace. Local and international actors, norms, institutions and interests engage with each other in various different contexts, according to their respective power relations and their different conceptions of legitimate authority structures.

Strategic Peacebuilding Pathways (Wheel)

Three major areas of strategic peace building:


1. Efforts to prevent, respond to, and transform violent conflict;
2. Efforts to promote justice and healing; and
3. Efforts to promote structural and institutional change.

Peace building is the development of constructive personal, group, and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. It aims to resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. Peacebuilding can include conflict prevention; conflict management; conflict resolution and transformation, and post-conflict reconciliation.

Peacebuilding becomes **strategic** when it works over the long run and at **all levels of society** to establish and sustain relationships among people locally and globally. Strategic peacebuilding connects people and groups **on the ground** (community and religious groups, grassroots organizations, etc.) with **policymakers and powerbrokers** (governments, the United Nations, corporations, banks, etc.) It aims not only to resolve conflicts, but to build societies, institutions, policies, and relationships that are better able to sustain peace and justice.

Strategic peacebuilders address issues of human rights, economic prosperity, and environmental sustainability as well as violence. Strategic peacebuilding stretches across generations. While it engages immediate crises, strategic peacebuilding recognizes that peacemaking is a long-term vocation that requires the building of cross-group networks and alliances that will survive intermittent conflicts and create a platform for sustainable human development and security.

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Categorizing approaches to Peace building

Negative peace

Negative peace refers to the absence of direct or "hot" violence, which refers to acts that impose immediate harm on a given subject or group. In this sense, "*negative peace building*" (aimed at negative peace) intentionally focuses on addressing the *direct* factors driving or mitigating harmful conflict. When applying the term "peacebuilding" to this work, there is an explicit attempt by those designing and planning a peacebuilding effort to reduce direct violence.

Positive peace (Structural violence)

Positive peace refers to the absence of *both direct violence as well as structural violence*. Structural violence refers to the ways that systems & institutions in society cause, reinforce, or perpetuate direct violence. In this sense, "*positive peacebuilding*" (aimed at positive peace) intentionally focuses on address the *indirect* factors driving or mitigating harmful conflict, with an emphasis on engaging institutions, policies, and political-economic conditions as they relate to exploitation and repression.

While Galtung's original & subsequent literature on the concept of positive peace do include references to cultural violence, for encyclopedic purposes it is still useful to reserve its absence for a term that Lederach and others have since developed to remedy gaps in understanding that were not sufficiently addressed through scholarly discussion of positive peace until the mid-1990s.

Cultural violence

Refers to the absence of all three types of violence enumerated above: direct, structural, & cultural. Cultural violence refers to aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence the ways in which direct or structural violence look or feel "right" according to the moral fabric of society. In this sense, "*just peacebuilding*" (aimed at justpeace) intentionally combines the methods of "positive peace building" (as described above) with a special focus on building and transforming sustainable relationships among conflicting sectors & cultures in such a way that promotes more alignment between each culture's *mores* (standards of "right" behavior or conditions) and the extent to which those *mores* are built/equipped to prevent, resolve, and heal patterns of direct and structural violence.

Components of peace building

The activities included in peace building vary depending on the situation and the agent of peacebuilding. Successful peace building activities create an environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace; reconcile opponents; prevent conflict from restarting; integrate civil society; create rule of law mechanisms; and address underlying structural and societal issues. To accomplish these goals, peacebuilding must address functional structures, emotional conditions and social psychology, social stability, rule of law and ethics, and cultural sensitivities.

Preconflictpeacebuilding interventions aim to prevent the start of violent conflict. These strategies involve a variety of actors and sectors in order to transform the conflict. Even though the definition of peace building includes preconflict interventions, in practice most peace building interventions are post conflict. However, many peace building scholars advocate an increased focus on preconflictpeacebuilding in the future. Barnett *et al.* divides post conflictpeacebuilding into three dimensions: stabilizing the post-conflict zone, restoring state institutions, and dealing with social and economic issues. Activities within the first dimension reinforce state stability post-conflict and discourage former combatants from returning to war (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or DDR). Second dimension activities build state capacity to provide basic public goods and increase state legitimacy. Programs in the third dimension build a post-conflict society's ability to manage conflicts peacefully and promote socioeconomic development.

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1st Dimension	2nd Dimension	3rd Dimension
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taking away weapons • Re-integrating former combatants into civilian society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rebuilding basic facilities, transportation and communication networks, utilities • Developing rule of law systems and public administration • Building educational and health infrastructure • Providing technical and capacity-building assistance for institutions • Creating legitimate (democratic, accountable) state institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trauma counseling • Transitional justice and restoration • Community dialogue • Building bridges between different communities and challenge the state peacefully • Increasing human rights • Gender empowerment • Raising environmental awareness • Promoting economic development • Developing a civil society and private sector that can represent diverse interests

A mixture of locally and internationally focused components is key to building a long-term sustainable peace. MacGinty says that while different "indigenous" communities utilize different conflict resolution techniques, most of them share the common characteristics described in the table below. Since indigenous peacebuilding practices arise from local communities, they are tailored to local context and culture in a way that generalized international peacebuilding approaches are not.

Local, customary and traditional	International
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respected local figures • Public dimension • Storytelling and airing of grievances • Emphasis on relationships • Reliance on local resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top-down: engages with national elites, not locals • Exclusive: deals are made behind closed doors • Technocratic/ahistorical basis: emphasis on 'striking a deal', 'moving on' • Modeled on corporate culture: reaching a deal, meeting deadlines prioritized over relations • Relies on external personnel, ideas

Peacekeeping has been one of the main conflict management tools used by the international community to restore or safeguard peace and security. Since 1948, the United Nations has established 70 peace operations and has substantially evolved, adopting approaches to peace that extend beyond purely military concerns. Indeed, the promises of peacekeeping as effective instrument of conflict reduction may, to some extent, explain the evolution toward multidimensional missions and the unprecedented number of peacekeepers deployed in the last decade. As consequence, the growing importance of peacekeeping effectiveness has sparked a new wave of research that empirically investigates whether and under which conditions UN peacekeeping works.

Peacekeepers are mostly deployed in conflict or post conflict environments where violence is either ongoing or lingering. Thus, violence remains a priority for peace missions. Consequently, peacekeeping is deemed successful or effective according to whether it curbs conflict in several dimensions. Effective missions are those responsible for decreasing the intensity of battle violence, protecting civilians, and containing conflict diffusion and recurrence in the postwar phase. Each mission, however, is deployed in different contexts and operates under variable conditions that affect the operation's capacity to influence conflict. Concerning mission features, peacekeeping success is more likely when large contingents are deployed under robust mandates. Mission type, size, and composition signal credible commitment from the international community and empower peacekeepers to halt violence while guaranteeing the implementation of peace agreements. These nuanced understandings of peacekeeping stem from the availability of new data on both conflict and peace operations at the national and subnational levels of analysis. Moreover, the empirical study of the effectiveness of peace operations has recently been flanked by simulation-based forecasting, field experiments, and surveys investigating local-level outcomes of peace missions.

Unsurprisingly, the focus on violence and conflict outcomes as indicators of success is debatable. First, in dealing with violence, peacekeeping operations produce spillover effects that are largely neglected, such as refugee flows and terrorist violence. Second, given the wide range of functions performed by UN peacekeepers, including electoral assistance, economic reconstruction, and state building, it is reasonable to include these aspects when defining effectiveness. Third, and relatedly, no assessment of short- versus long-term implications of peacekeeping for political,

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social, and economic development in the host country has been forthcoming. While reducing infant mortality, inequality, and crime are not necessarily tasks for peacekeepers, it is vital to study whether and how UN missions may have shaped the quality of peace in host countries.

International bodies in mandating peace at regional level

Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has authorized more than 70 peace missions. In addition, regional organizations, such as the African Union and the European Union, have conducted their own peace operations an additional 65 missions between 1946 and 2016. As the number of countries contributing to UN peace operations, merely 45 after the end of the Cold War, has reached almost 120 in the contemporary period. In the same temporal span, the number of “Blue Helmets,” or peacekeeping troops, increased from 10,000 to almost 100,000 globally.

The United Nations’ increasingly active role after the end of the Cold War has drawn further attention to peacekeeping. This does not aim to provide complete answers to these questions, seeking instead to review and contextualize the wealth of quantitative research on this very topic. Importantly, before appropriate answers are found, lingering challenges must be addressed. First, what is meant by effectiveness? Several conceptualizations and operationalizations have been suggested as measures of peacekeeping’s utility, such as compliance with ceasefires (Fortna, 2008), the combination of peaceful spells and stable polities (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), protecting civilians from violence (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013), and reducing levels of violence between belligerents (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014).

Second, how should an operations’ effectiveness be studied, and which mission features matter? Some scholars have focused on the mere presence of peace operations or have extended their analysis to different mission mandates. More recently, quantitative research has investigated whether the size of a mission, its composition of troops or observers, and the heterogeneity of nationalities can affect its effectiveness.

Third, does it matter how the effectiveness of peace operations is studied? The research design selected to evaluate and study the effectiveness of peace operations is, itself, a salient issue. For example, are peace operations deployed to the easy or hard cases? How have specific research designs accounted for this nonrandom assignment of the treatment and omitted viable bias? Moreover, further debates on the empirical study of peace operations have focused on temporal and spatial analytical units: should researchers focus only on country–year measures to understand the effectiveness of peace operations or use more granular temporal and geographical units? Missions have been deployed in very large countries such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, or Sudan, but the physical deployment occurs in more specific locations. Should the capacity of peace operations to stop violence at the sub national level also be studied?

The remaining sections of this article discuss the aforementioned issues and questions and are organized as follows. First, the conceptualizations and operationalizations used in research on the effectiveness of peace operations are reviewed. Second, the theoretical framework usually used to study peace operations effectiveness. Moreover, advantages and disadvantages of the range of research designs used in the empirical literature is discussed. Third, the main findings using tables capturing results of different dependent and explanatory variables are presented, including trends of peace operations in terms of size of deployments, contributing countries, and evolution of mandates. The article concludes with a section that highlights what remains absent in empirical studies of peacekeeping effectiveness. Quantitative work on peace operations is available, and qualitative scholars have provided substantial and critical contributions to understanding the effectiveness of peace operations (see Autesserre. However, the study of peacekeeping must handle an emergent imbalance, given that the United Nations has a longer history of peace operations than other regional organizations and, consequently, dominates the quantitative literature. Furthermore, this article focuses on peace operations in civil wars, mostly due to the structural changes in conflict dynamics and in the deployment of peace operations the post-Cold War era, and the summary, while inclusive, is not exhaustive.

What Do We Mean by the Effectiveness of Peace Operations

Defining peace, theoretically and empirically, has been a perennial issue for scholars of international relations and peace studies. The concept of “negative peace,” or the absence of war, has been challenged by differing perspectives on “positive peace” (Galtung, 1969), including concepts such as “participatory peace” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) to “bottom-up peace” (Autesserre, 2010). The operationalization of conflict has also been defined according to different thresholds (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Stinnett et al., 2002), specifying different targets of violence (Eck & Hultman, 2007), and referring to temporal and within-country variation (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Hence, the definition of the effectiveness of peace operations is vigorously debated in the peacekeeping literature, and it has only become more relevant as the field has adopted systematic empirical assessments of mission performance.

Since its inception in the early 1990s, the so-called “second wave” of peacekeeping studies struggled to define and measure success (Fortna & Howard, 2008). In 1988, Paul Diehl published what may be one of the first studies on peacekeeping effectiveness that moves beyond the descriptive approach of the first wave of peacekeeping studies (Fortna & Howard, 2008). The core and main criterion for peacekeeping success, according to Diehl, depends on the capacity of the mission to limit armed conflict and prevent its renewal. A secondary criterion concerns the mission’s ability to foster peaceful settlement (Diehl, 1988). Based on these criteria, Diehl evaluates six UN missions and concludes that peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when it is consent based, when it deploys neutral lightly-armed personnel, and when the geographical conditions allows separation of combatants and detection of violations. In general,

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he also observes that peacekeeping is mostly successful in its core objective (i.e., limiting conflict) but contributes less to peaceful settlements. A similar set of criteria has been proposed by Brown (1993) who explores whether a specific mission fulfilled the actual mandate, reduced conflict, and contributed to peaceful resolution. The last two criteria correspond to Diehl's concept of success, while the first criterion circumscribes the expectation of success to the mandated aims of the mission. In criticizing Diehl's approach, Johansen (1994) argues that applying the aforementioned criteria to each mission is controversial because Diehl focuses on the renewal of violence or conflict settlements conditions over which peacekeepers may have had, at best, only a marginal impact. By considering outcomes that are indirect results of peacekeeping activities, Diehl's evaluation can be too optimistic or too pessimistic, depending on the mission under scrutiny. In anticipation of continuing concerns regarding the impact of the peacekeeping mission(s), Johansen proposes an alternative framework that evaluates the effects of the mission on the quality of life of local population. He places emphasis on "what-if" counterfactuals, namely the likely conditions had a peace mission not been deployed. In a sense, both the evaluation of counterfactual scenarios (e.g., the expected outcomes without a peacekeeping mission) and accounting for which tasks peacekeepers are mandated to perform, echoes recent appeals for evaluating success against a set of baseline expectations (Diehl & Druckman, 2010; Han Dorussen, 2014). Ultimately, the basic idea of an operational standard for success may be misguided. Diehl & Druckman warn against using a single standard for success because "conclusions drawn on only one set of standards will lead policymakers to adopt certain policies without being aware of the full consequences of those policies" (2010, p. 5). To avoid unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations, what success entails in a broader sense must be specified. Over the years, the debate on the concept of peacekeeping effectiveness has centered on one crucial dimension: peace survival. However, other dimensions shape this debate, such as the divide between systematic and interpretative approaches. This section, however, focuses on how scholars advocating empirical evaluations of peacekeeping have contributed to the concept of peacekeeping effectiveness and, consequently, how its operationalization in statistical analysis is informed by large data. The divide between short- and long-term effects of peace missions has drawn significant attention to how missions reduce different dimensions of conflict and strengthen post conflict peace (see Sambanis, 2008). Hence, notwithstanding the much-discussed criteria proposed by Diehl, empirical evaluations of peacekeeping have embraced a parsimonious conceptualization of success. Short-term analyses of peacekeeping success tend to focus on whether missions contain and limit conflict violence. Researchers have measured the conflict-reducing effect of peace missions in different ways. While the operationalization of success as a dependent variable varies across studies, all alternatives share a focus on the immediate (yearly or monthly) conflict-reducing capacity of peacekeeping. The most common measure of success in early empirical studies of peacekeeping effectiveness was peace duration. Fortna (2003, 2004A, 2004B) operationalized effectiveness as peace spells terminating when new violence occurred within the same conflict dyad after a ceasefire. Similarly, Hultman et al. (2015) use post conflict stability to evaluate mission success. However, their analysis differs from Fortna's not only in how peacekeeping is measured (i.e., size of deployment rather than mere mission presence) but also in how peace duration is measured. As in Hartzell et al. (2001), peace duration is the count of months of peace in the post conflict period.

This strand of literature assumes that peace is an established condition and that a peacekeeper's job is to maintain it. Notably, however, the United Nations started sending troops to ongoing conflicts soon after the end of the Cold War. Thus, missions should be evaluated not only against their ability to keep peace but also according to their capacity for making peace. Relatedly, success was then evaluated in terms of war duration. Successful peace operations are expected to reduce the length of conflict and facilitate peaceful settlement (or at least ceasefires). For example, Beardsley (2012) looks at stalemates and victories after crises and investigates whether peacekeeping (and other types of military involvements) lengthens the time parties take to compromise or emerge victorious compared to diplomatic actions. DeRouen, Jr. (2003) further disaggregates UN diplomatic actions into mediation, dispatch of observer groups, calls for action, and emergency deployments. All these actions are deemed possible determinants of success, measured in terms of termination of a crisis. Notably, using war duration as the standard of success tends to conflate peacekeeping with peacemaking both studies referred to here do not clearly distinguish peacekeeping from other types of intervention. Nonetheless, prolonging peace is not the same as shortening wars. Yet, these have both become important standards for success, and contemporary peacekeeping is often expected to produce both outcomes. The propensity for peacekeeping to either prolong peace or shorten war is likely determined by different configurations of factors, such as breadth of the mission's mandate, military composition, and duration and timing of deployment. Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) present one of the few studies that evaluates peacekeeping's capacity to shorten war and sustain peace. Ruggeri et al. (2016A) propose a measure of localized success by exploring the impact of UN peace mission presence and size on the duration of conflict and its onset within sub national geographical areas within countries. Because the authors condition conflict onset on peace in the previous year, they are evaluating peacekeeping relative to its capacity to shorten conflict and lengthen peace.

Whether peacekeepers are good at ending war is crucial because ceasefire or other temporary settlements are important conditions for reaching peace agreements. Greig and Diehl (2005) point out that peacekeeping and peacemaking are interrelated conflict-resolution tools. Here, successful peacekeeping should not just shorten wars but also enable and strengthen peace processes (this is the second criterion of success as defined by Diehl, 1988). Not only do Greig and Diehl find that peacekeeping is negatively associated with likelihood of negotiations or mediation, but peacekeeping also decreases the chances of settlement when such processes are undertaken. Thus, while peacekeeping may halt or limit hostilities, it has strong negative externalities on peacemaking and, thus, on the long-term resolution of the conflict. The authors refer to this as the peacekeeping dilemma.

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Another and perhaps most obvious outcome for short-term success are decreasing conflict intensity. In one of the first analyses of peacekeeping effectiveness, Heldt (2001) evaluates peacekeeping success based on presence of civil war. Using a global sample of all civil wars from 1960 to 1999, he explores whether mission or conflict features have different marginal impacts on war. However, the research design used in this analysis, in line with many others, does not tackle the problem of nonrandom assignments for peacekeeping missions.

Most recent work has advanced the research design to empirically test peacekeeping success. In particular, a distinction is usually made between battle-related deaths and one-sided violence (or violence against civilians). Hultman et al. (2014) find that larger deployment of UN peacekeeping troops (but not UN police and observers) reduces the intensity of violence on the battlefield in ongoing civil wars on a monthly basis. The authors replicate a similar analysis focusing on one-sided violence, and they highlight somewhat different conclusions suggesting that battlefield violence and civilian killings results from distinct dynamics (Hultman et al., 2013). Kathman and Wood (2014) also examine each mission's composition and its impact on civilian victimization in the aftermath of conflict. Bove and Ruggeri (2015) propose an additional factor associated with protection of civilians beside size and personnel type, namely the national heterogeneity of UN contingents. However, civilian victimization can occur on different scales and can even reach genocidal levels. Peace missions have been deployed in scenarios with high risk of genocide; thus, they have also been evaluated in the literature based on their capacity to quell or forestall genocides and politicides (Kathman & Wood, 2011).

Geographic containment is another criterion used to judge whether peace missions work. Beardsley (2011) illustrates how the presence of peacekeepers reduces the risk of conflict onset in neighboring states. This containment effect also exists within countries. Indeed Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) argue that peacekeeping constrains diffusion of violence during civil wars. In their analysis, using a subnational and geographically disaggregated research design, they assess the extent to which peacekeepers manage to contain and shrink conflict areas.

All criteria for success presented so far share a limited time perspective focusing on the yearly or monthly effect of peacekeeping on a set of outcomes. Other scholars have adopted a longer temporal span, which allows the evaluation of broader peacebuilding objectives. For example, Diehl et al. (1996) discusses the risk of renewed interstate conflict within 10 years; Beardsley (2013) also posits that UN missions reduce peace fragility in the long term. Diplomatic engagement or sanctions, he finds, are only temporary stopgaps for violence, which usually re-erupts within 5 to 10 years from conflict termination. Among others, the most notable definition of long-term success is provided by Doyle and Sambanis (2000). They propose a measure of success that covers 2, 5, and 10 years of the postwar phase. Two versions of successful peacebuilding are proposed. The lenient version is concerned with negative peace and requires (a) No renewal of war,

(b) No low-level violence

(c) Uncontested sovereignty. The strict version adds another requirement to these: democratization (or political openness). This definition of success (and oftentimes its operationalization) has been used in numerous studies: Bigombe et al. (2000), Fortna (2003, 2004A), Gilligan and Stedman (2003), Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2008), Gizelis (2009), and Kim (2015).

The increasing relevance of peacebuilding and long-term effects of peace operations has produced a growing number of studies focusing on outcomes that are not strictly related to security and conflict. Some of these outcomes are more limited in scope and thus are insufficient for defining success. Others are intertwined with the concept of positive peace. These outcomes include whether specific peacekeeping tasks are associated with more cooperative responses from the local population (Gizelis, 2011; Ruggeri et al., 2012; Dorussen & Gizelis, 2013); the number of violent attacks against peacekeepers (Salverda, 2013; Fjelde et al., 2016); reported cases of sexual exploitation and abuses (Beber et al., 2017; S. Karim & Beardsley, 2016; Nordås & Rustad, 2013); local perceptions of peacekeeping effectiveness (Karim, 2016); satisfaction with the mission performances (Kelmendi & Radin, 2016); democratic transition (Joshi, 2013); democratization (Steinert & Grimm, 2015); as well as economic development (Caruso et al., 2016) and improvements in quality of life (Kim, 2015).

Two main shifts are evident in "what is" the effectiveness of peace operations, both conceptual and analytical. First, an important evolution of the political phenomena is under scrutiny. Or, to put it more technically, a shift in the dependent variable has occurred, from a focus on peace survival to the effects of peacekeeping on violence dynamics. Clearly, this shift is neither complete nor necessarily desirable, but recent empirical studies, on average, exhibit this tendency. This shift has also occurred in consonance with an analytical move toward a comparatively disaggregated study of peacekeeping as the unit of analysis has switched from country-year or conflict spell to models featuring the higher temporal granularity of conflict dynamics (usually monthly variation) while endorsing more precise spatial variation within countries.

The Effectiveness of Peace Operations

This section briefly summarizes the main theoretical tenants of quantitative empirical study of peacekeeping effectiveness. Most of these theories (e.g., Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Virginia Page Fortna, 2008; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013, 2014) are clearly rooted in the rationalist explanations of conflict and, therefore, suggest that peace operations can modify parties' incentives by increasing the costs of fighting, mitigating commitment problems, and facilitating information flows among belligerents. Second, this section highlights the data and research designs that have been used to evaluate the effectiveness of peace operations.

Peace Effectiveness and Theoretical Mechanisms

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The theoretical arguments put forward to explain the effectiveness of a peace mission hinge on the idea that peacekeeping increases the cost of fighting. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) propose a simple model in which peacebuilding outcomes are a function of three factors: (a) the level of hostility prevalent at the start of the peace process, (b) local capacities for reconstruction and development, and (c) international capacities for peacebuilding mostly through UN peace operations. Peacekeeping effectiveness seems to work mostly through three mechanisms: deterrence, commitment, and information (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016B).

First, peacekeeping deterrence helps prevent conflicts from spilling over into noncombatant areas, thus reducing and limiting violence. Second, because ceasefires provide opportunities for government and rebel authorities to increase their bargaining power, the local presence of peacekeepers matters because it commits leaders to follow previously agreed rules, including combatants' interdiction from civilian areas. Third, information flows can be crucial, as government and rebel leaders often lack information about their relative strength. By providing such information, peacekeepers can assist the peace process. Furthermore, peacekeepers obtain vital information through their frequent interactions with locals, which allow more proactive protection of civilians (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015).

Further elaborating the informational argument, monitoring is a commonly proposed mechanism for effectiveness. Peacekeepers observe and report on parties' behavior and conflict processes. Thus, the peacekeepers' presence may spur cooperation by both reducing uncertainty and containing defection, particularly in areas where UN personnel are stationed. Collecting information through monitoring has also indirect effects on the cost-benefit of violence: it reduces chances of surprise attacks and increases the state's cost of heavily repressing rebels.

Observing and monitoring, per se, are not sufficient conditions for deterring parties from using violence. Indeed, monitoring activities are more effective when troops are deployed instead of unarmed observers. Signaling commitment and willingness to punish violations by deploying large military contingent is key for the success of peace missions. Ruggeri et al. (2016A) highlight a difference between commitment and deterrence. They argue that commitment relies on ensuring that parties do not subvert and violate agreements, while deterrence is used to avoid local actors to spoil peace when national principals loosely control them. As consequence, military presence is even more relevant for deterrence than for commitment, as the latter can ultimately be political at its core. Relatedly, when comparing mission cross-nationally, Fortna (2008) notices that Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions (the latter with robust enforcement mandates) do not have a distinguishable effect on halting conflict. She identifies the mechanisms through which peacekeeping reduces violence as political and economic, and are not, therefore, a function of military capability. But such translations should be undertaken carefully when translating dynamics at the national level to political actors with local dynamics.

Political and economic leverages (or commitment) may be insufficient for deterring local actors from engaging in violence, especially when elites lack control over their constituents. The mechanism of commitment works at the institutional or macro level and is independent of military capacity; for the role of military deployment, it is more salient for deterrence at the local level. Peacekeepers can also play more active roles to signal commitment, instead of relying on passively monitoring compliance, including by enforcing peace agreements or ceasefires and by reassuring parties. Both enforcement and reassurance require more engagement and proactive stances; therefore, they are more reliant on the mission's military capacity. Enforcement missions are not consent based, which implies that at least one party must be coerced not to use violence. Exerting this compelling effect requires a clear, visible, and credible threat to use force, more than deterrence does. Similarly, reassurance is usually associated with security guarantees offered by the United Nations, whose credibility is predicated on its military presence. In other words, both enforcement and reassurance mechanisms rely on higher degrees of coercion than the others.

A second challenge is causal identification. Peacekeeping is not random, which creates problems when estimating the treatment effect. The evolution of empirical approaches has substantially increased our confidence in the evidence supporting peacekeeping effectiveness. Early empirical approaches used cross-sectional country-level data in which outcomes were compared without correcting for the influence of nonrandom assignment of peace operations to conflicts. In the best case, peacekeeper presence was measured as a dummy, which hid many substantial differences across peace missions. Using a dummy to measure peacekeeping in host countries and comparing them to other civil wars without peacekeeping captures any significant heterogeneity among these groups but hides all variations across missions. Again, the problem of nonrandom assignment has usually been overlooked or has not been addressed.

Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) were the first to propose matching for pre-process data and to allow comparison between most similar cases. Matching allows researchers to balance the treatment and control group based on a set of observable factors to generate meaningful counterfactuals. Once the sample is matched, observations are weighted so that the two groups are comparable. Thus, the difference in conflict-related violence between the matched treated factual (civil wars with peacekeeping) and the untreated counterfactual (civil wars without peacekeeping) is an estimate of the average effect of peacekeeping on violence. Matching has become a popular tool for addressing issues stemming from nonrandom assignment of peace operations and is now widely used in statistical models (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon 2013; Costalli, 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016B). One problem with such an approach, however, is that no observable factors could determine whether civil wars receive peacekeepers. For instance, some countries could be more likely to host Blue Helmets because of political motivations that may not be known or easily controlled for in statistical models. To overcome this issue, other approaches to address selection bias have been proposed, including instrumental variables approaches. Vivalt (2014) and Carnegie and Mikulaschek (2016) propose the rotation of seats in the Security Council as possible source of exogenous variation. Vivalt argues that countries are less likely to receive peace operations if they are sitting temporarily in the Security Council when conflict is ongoing. Carnegie and

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Mikulaschek exploit the idea that when rotation provides seats to more African countries, they use it to get peace operations to nearby states to reduce the negative externalities of conflict. Rotation is based on election, though, so it is not random. Hence, they add as a further instrument the African presidency in the Security Council, which is based on the alphabetical order of council members’ names. Ijaz (2014) proposes supply of peacekeeping as an instrument, arguing that domestic shocks in troop provision reduces the odds of enforcement missions being deployed. As she acknowledges, however, variation in supply explains the lower likelihood of a specific type of mission only. Overall, the instrumental variable approach is an exception rather than the rule in studies on the effectiveness of peace operations, in part because of the challenges in finding strong and accurate instruments.

Recent work has shown promising new research designs and methods in the empirical study of the effectiveness of peace operations. The use of surveys to explore how peace operations affect attitudes toward peace attempts and other conflict dynamics has been encouraging (Mironova& Whitt, 2015; Kelmendi&Radin, 2016). In addition, field experiments in the study of peace operations have been used to increase the internal validity of empirical tests of theoretical mechanisms (Mvukiyehe&Samii, 2010; Beber et al., 2017). Finally, a recent wave of research is providing advanced and sophisticated methods based on empirical estimates to simulate and forecast the effectiveness of peace operations (Hegre, Hultman, &Nygard, 2011).

Empirical Findings and Trends

Over time, the literature has introduced new and more nuanced measurements of peacekeeping as explanatory variables for conflict. These range from mere presence of peace operations (Diehl, 1988) and mandate types (Doyle &Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2008), to size and composition of peacekeeping personnel , more recently, local presence of peacekeepers.

The main findings of empirical studies of peacekeeping effectiveness, which includes several outcomes of interest related to conflict and peace processes that are now commonly used as parameters of effectiveness. One of the broadest distinctions is made with regard to mandate type: Variation in success overlaps with variations in mandate type. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find that the mandate is key for success, and after distinguishing between observer, traditional, multidimensional, and enforcement peace missions, they posit that each has a different impact on peacebuilding and ending violence. Traditional missions, which encompass military deployment for interposition between belligerents, have no impact on these two outcomes, whereas multidimensional missions have a beneficial effect on both participatory peace and tend to shorten conflicts.

Table 1. Peace Operation Effectiveness and Peace/Conflict Outcomes

Outcome	Mandates	Peacekeeper Presence	Troops Size	Police	Observers
Peace duration	✓	✓	✓	NS	NS
Conflict duration	✓	Mixed			
Civilian killings	✓		✓	✓	x
Genocides		✓in long-term, x in short-term			
Battle-related violence			✓	NS	NS
Peace settlements		Mixed			
Geographic containment	✓	✓	✓	x	NS
Conflict duration, local		✓	✓		
Peace duration, local		Mixed	Mixed		
Peacebuilding	✓	✓	NS		

Enforcement is also effective in reducing violence, but it does not contribute significantly to peacebuilding. Fortna (2003) uses the same categories of peace missions to assess their performances on the duration of peace. Unsurprisingly, traditional missions have the strongest deterrence capacity and reduce the chances of conflict recurrence. Deterrence

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capacity diminishes observer and multidimensional missions, respectively. Counter intuitively, enforcement missions are not associated with more durable peace. These findings contrast with the conclusion of Hultman et al. (2015) that more UN troops (usually deployed in enforcement missions) produce more stable postconflict environments. Peacekeeper observers and police, however, seem to have no relevant impact on postconflict peace. Other studies have also shown that most successful missions have robust mandates (Hultman, 2010; Kreps, 2010; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). Hultman (2010) categorizes mandates based on robustness and protection of civilians tasks (POC), and her analysis indicates that only POC reduced violence against civilians. Other studies have only incidentally controlled for mandate robustness. For example, Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) show that robustness reinforces the containment effect of missions. In fact, mandates are often ignored in the empirical analysis, relegated instead to serve as control variables. This lack of attention to mandates has resulted in a striking heterogeneity of mandate classifications. Furthermore, while these mandates are often coded consistently within a piece of research, mandate coding is often inconsistent among different works. Thus, mandates do affect conflict dynamics, but comparisons across studies may fail to categorize them consistently.

Other operationalizations of peacekeeping have produced more consistent and comparable results. First, peace missions (especially UN missions) produce more durable peace (Fortna, 2004A, 2003, 2004B; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008), produce comparatively geographically contained conflicts, shorter episodes of local violence (Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016B), improve the odds of peacebuilding success (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), and lower the odds of genocide over the long term (Kathman & Wood, 2011). Importantly, some findings at the national level do not automatically translate at the local level. As mentioned, Gilligan and Sergenti's findings (2008) at the national level resonate with Diehl's; they find peacekeepers to be better at keeping peace than making it. A more disaggregated approach, however, tells a different story at the local level. At this scale, Ruggeri and colleagues (2016B) find that peacekeepers shorten conflict episodes, but the empirical results on the capacity to deter local conflict onset is inconclusive. With regard to mass killings, the effect of interventions appears conditional on whether the mission directly challenges and engages the perpetrators. While this would suggest that only some missions reduce large-scale civilian killings, Melander (2009) finds that, after controlling for unobservable factors leading to deployment, peacekeeping does have a clear preventive effect on mass killings. Kathman and Wood (2011) also find that third-party intervention can trigger more intense genocides and politicides in the months following the deployment. Over time, however, violence significantly decreases if the intervention is perceived as impartial. More recent studies measuring the size of deployment and the type of deployed personnel have further supported most of these results: large deployments of peacekeeping troops have consistently beneficial impacts on all conflict outcomes examined in the literature (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013, 2014, 2015; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016B). One notable exception is peacebuilding, which does not seem to be affected by the actual number of deployed personnel (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000).

Few studies include peacekeeping police and observer components, and they present mixed results. Hultman et al. (2014) find that larger deployment of UN peacekeeping troops (but not UN police and observers) reduces the intensity of violence on the battlefield in ongoing civil wars on a monthly basis. With regard to one-sided violence, more UN troops and police also effectively decrease violence against civilians, although observers produce the opposite effect (Hultman et al., 2013). Interestingly, UN troops can still effectively protect civilians in the aftermath of conflict (Kathman & Wood, 2014). Hence, on the one hand, peacekeeping police reduce the number of civilian killings but do not contribute to longer peace spells or reduce the number of battle-related deaths (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014). Even more worrisome, police seem to increase violence rather than contain it (Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). Furthermore, observers have no statistical impact on peace duration, battle-related violence, and geographic containment. Ultimately, the only significant effect found in the existing literature is that deployment of observers is associated with greater intensity of one-sided violence (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). Unarmed observers do not pose a threat to perpetrators of violence; thus, cannot exert a significant deterrent effect against mass killings.

Different dimensions of peacekeeping affect conflict dynamics, and each of these operationalizations captures something different but no exhaustive about peacekeeping. In other words, if peacekeeping is a latent variable, then it makes sense to reframe Table 1 according to conflict outcome instead of by operationalization. For example, regardless of how peacekeeping is measured, substantial evidence indicates that it fosters durability of peace. Similarly, consistent results on the benefits of peace operations are reported for civilian and battle deaths and geographic containment of violence. Some studies also agree that some missions promote peacebuilding, but this also depends on mandate type. At the local level, peacekeeper capacity shows encouraging results for halting violence but exerts a weaker effect on the duration of local peace. Finally, peacekeeper capacity to increase the likelihood of peace settlements is conditional on the type of settlement, such as compromise, victory, mediated, or negotiated agreement.

These include cooperation with and attacks against mission personnel, incidence of sexual exploitation and abuses (SEA), economic and social development, democratization, and human rights. This shift from ending violence to improving the quality of the peace has been central in qualitative work on peacekeeping but has only recently emerged in the empirical literature on peacekeeping.

Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) examine which activities carried out by peacekeepers are more effective at getting support from both governments and rebel groups. They find that activities related to improvements in human rights or otherwise entail active involvement of the United Nations do not elicit cooperative behavior from either side. However, activities that strengthen state capacity are usually supported by both government and rebels, with the latter possibly being motivated by future rent seeking. In another analysis, Gizelis (2011) shows that cooperation with peacekeepers is more

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likely if the prewar status of women in the host country is high. She measures the status of women using educational enrollment rates, however, which does not allow her to establish the extent to which international actors include women in peacebuilding. Another condition that spurs cooperation with UN personnel is the asymmetry of capabilities between rebels and governments. In the presence of weak rebels, cooperation is more likely because peacekeepers play a central role in reducing commitment problems and, to some degree, reducing the imbalance with the government (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2012). Research on physical attacks against peacekeepers produces consistent mirroring results. First, rebels are more likely to target Blue Helmets if they lose ground on the battlefield and when they perceive that peacekeepers are taking the government’s side. By doing so, rebels aim at gaining or retaining bargaining power and preserving internal cohesion (Fjelde, Hultman, & Lindberg Bromley, 2016). In addition, stronger rebel groups are more likely to launch attacks against peacekeepers (Salverda, 2013), consistently with the finding suggesting that cooperation is associated with a group’s weakness.

Table 2. Peace Operation Effectiveness and Nonconflict Outcomes

Outcomes	Does peacekeeping have a beneficial effect?
Cooperation with peacekeeping	x if PK addresses human rights issues ✓ if peacekeeping addresses government capacity and has supportive role
Attacks against peacekeeping	x if peacekeeping is progovernment and rebels lose militarily
Sexual exploitations and abuses	✓if more women participate in peacekeeping
Economic development	Mixed (local vs. national)
Social development (quality of life)	✓on health; NS on literacy rate
Political development (democracy)	✓
Human rights	Mixed

Conflict-related sexual abuses has also increased, and several studies have focused on the effectiveness of peacekeeping at reducing sexual exploitation and abuses (SEA). Karim and Beardsley (2016) argue that peacekeeping missions that receive increased military contributions from countries with strong gender equality values reduce SEA. The presence of female peacekeepers also reduces SEA, although this evidence is less robust, perhaps due to the fact that the involvement of women can reduce SEA depends on the actual function they perform within mission.

The study of the economic impact of peacekeeping has produced mixed results. Hoeffler et al. (2010) systematically explore the effect of peacekeeping on national growth during the first 3 years of peace and find that UN presence increases growth of approximately 2.4%. However, when peacekeeping is measured in terms of personnel size and expenditure, the effect disappears. In their study on economic recovery in South Sudan, Caruso et al. (2016) point out that the presence of Blue Helmets and the “security spillover” leads to an increased cereal production in counties where they are deployed. Another interesting finding on the disaggregated or local impacts of peacekeeping suggests that the arrival of UN staff also affects the local economy and may result in the emergence of distorted “peacekeeping economies” (Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović, 2009). While the extent of these peacekeeping economies is empirically underdefined, Mvukiyeye and Samii (2010) found that peacekeeping stimulates the local economy in several ways, including increasing the employment opportunities leading to higher incomes and inflation. Carnahan et al.’s (2006) report on the economic impact of peacekeeping provides more information on how deployment may alter economic indicators locally and nationally, but the report does not provide definite conclusions regarding the causal effect of UN missions.

In addition to economic development, previous research offers some indications that peacekeeping missions may influence quality of life in the postconflict phase. Kim (2015) argues that multilateral interventions result in governments being more responsive to citizens’ needs, while unilateral military interventions are more self-interested and often focus on protecting the government. Hence, UN intervention improves health conditions and resources for reconstruction, although it does not influence literacy rates.

Regarding political development, peacekeeping seems to promote democratization. The two main studies on this issue are Joshi (2013) and Steinert and Grimm (2015), and these authors use different measures of democratization changes in the Polity IV score and Freedom House Index, respectively. They both find that missions do promote democratic processes, which can be measured as improvements on the scale of their selected index. While these results are encouraging, both studies suffer the same limitation; they merely identify a democratization process independently of whether peacekeepers contributed to this. Peacekeeping may be incidental to the outcome, and this leaves open the

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possibility that democratic transition led by external parties creates more instability than autonomous processes. In other words, the presence of peacekeepers may or may not translate to UN led democratization.

Finally, peacekeeping can also improve human rights in host countries but, as in other cases, mandates and activities in specific policy areas make the difference. Murdie and Davies (2010) point out that peacekeeping does not unconditionally help human rights. Mediation attempts and humanitarian missions, they argue, have a positive effect on physical integrity rights. While mediation improves both current and future human rights conditions, humanitarian missions have a longer-term effect and can be detrimental to physical security in the short run. Peksen (2012) explores this finding further and concludes that pro-government and neutral interventions may increase human rights violations by lowering incentives to reduce repression. Hostile interventions do not generate major improvements in types of violations; in fact, they result in more political imprisonments in the affected country. Although these findings depict a grim picture, it is important to note that Peksen (2012) examines both multilateral and unilateral military interventions. Whether UN peace missions produce similarly detrimental effects requires further investigation.

Evaluating Peacekeeping Effectiveness

Consensus on the “gold standard” for assessing peacekeeping effectiveness is still missing, and the necessity of such an ultimate standard is unclear. If effectiveness is a function of a mission’s mandate, then there are as many standards as there are types of mandates. On the other hand, advocating for a gold standard demands that judgment on missions must be confined to a more parsimonious set of outcomes than those reviewed here. However, the criterion or set of criteria selected should not lead to a belief that other outcomes are irrelevant for understanding peacekeeping as a practice. For example, restricting evaluation of effectiveness to the peacekeepers’ capacity to maintain peace and reduce military fights should not imply that protection of civilians is less relevant. Peacekeeping operations are complex and affect the evolution of conflict within countries at various levels (e.g., local population, rebels, and political elites) and scales (i.e., local, national, and transnational). Although the literature has proposed a variety of concepts of effectiveness, aspects of the dynamic relationship between peace operations and conflict have received less attention and may have the same influence. Some are related to the conflict itself, while others concern the long-term transformation of fragile countries into peaceful and stable societies (see Sambanis, 2008, for an exception).

Among conflict-related aspects that have been sidelined within the literature, conflict trajectory is certainly a relevant and surprising absentee. Indeed, timing of third-party interventions is crucial in the conflict management literature because each conflict phase requires targeted approaches and allows for limited objectives. In the literature on conflict management, well-designed and successful mediation efforts take place when conflicts are ripe for intervention (Zartman & Berman, 1982), but theories of ripeness do not help predict when ripe moments will occur. It is probably more useful to think about conflict phases and which interventions are more likely to succeed in each scenario. The disaggregation of conflict into phases can be summarized as follows: initial disputes of parties over an issue; at least one party threatens to use military force; actual use of military force; violence ceases but the dispute is not settled and force is still used as threat; military resolution is no longer an option but no settlement has been reached yet; finally, termination (Bloomfield & Leiss, 1969). Naturally, external interventions will set different objectives and criteria for effectiveness according to the phase of conflict. During the Cold War, UN peacekeeping missions were predominantly deployed in the last phase of conflict, when some form of settlement had been achieved and hostilities had ceased. In the early 1990s, the Security Council authorized some missions with a conflict prevention mandate to avoid escalation to military confrontation (e.g., in the Balkans). Most contemporary UN peace missions operate amid violence. Thus, whether peacekeepers are better at keeping rather than making peace may depend on the conflict phase they operate in. While UN peacekeeping, generally, has adapted its capacity to work in different scenarios with some success, most conflicts do not follow a linear trajectory. Civil wars can go through escalation and de-escalation repeatedly, putting the flexibility and adaptability of peacekeeping missions to the test. Often, peace operations may be deployed in the settlement phase when violence is absent only to witness an unexpected re-eruption of the conflict. Ideally, missions that successfully deter violence and promote a shift from hostility to post hostility phase should eventually adapt to the new scenario to avoid this risk. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) stands as proof. The Security Council authorized the dispatch of UN peacekeepers in South Sudan in summer 2011. The resolution highlighted the need to consolidate peace and outlined a mandate that prioritized postconflict peacebuilding and institution building (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Despite the awareness that violence was still present, the mission was designed under the assumption that South Sudan was in a conflict termination phase. The spiraling of violence in the following years and the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, made clear that UNMISS, as designed in 2011, was neither appropriate for conflict prevention nor for conflict resolution. As the head of the mission later declared, everyone was taken by surprise and the mission’s capacity was overwhelmed by the crisis (Nzambanita, 2014). This forced the Security Council to modify the original mandate and increase the commitment of military personnel to UNMISS to realign the mission’s capacity to the evolving situation. The mission continues to struggle to stabilize the country. In sum, peacekeeping missions vary in the timing of deployment; thus, the criteria to evaluate their success should be selected to match. In the very least, empirical studies on peacekeeping effectiveness should account and control for these differences. Most studies control for the intensity of violence, signature of ceasefires, and other settlements, but these variables fail to capture the combination of factors that define conflict phases. Consequently, it is difficult to determine which missions are more effective at different stages of the conflict or which are simply better equipped in responding to quick shifts across those phases. An explicit modeling of conflict dynamics in the empirical analysis of peacekeeping is still missing. Dixon (1996) acknowledged that international crises are fluid and that conflict phases can be accompanied by readjustment in strategies of interventions. Although his analysis includes several types of interventions and

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incidentally refers to military ones, his suggestion of using escalatory transitions to judge effectiveness is insightful. Furthermore, responsiveness to the evolution of conflict may be an additional important criterion to assess mission performances, especially in conflicts that are more susceptible to escalation. Even more crucially, it is possible in principle to identify an ideal entry point for peacekeepers along the conflict trajectory that reduces the likelihood of escalation and facilitates peacekeeping tasks.

In addition to conflict dynamics, mission dynamics are also overlooked in the existing literature. First, whether mission phases can be discussed in the way that conflicts are discussed is an open question. Systematic identification of stages in peacekeeping operations would provide interesting insights into which main phases the most successful missions go through. Second, the impact of mission duration on conflict has not yet been the subject of thorough investigation. The length of the peace operation is often included in a model's specification to reduce temporal dependencies, but the state-of-the-art peacekeeping literature does not explore the ideal duration of successful missions. At the same time, experience shows the duration of UN peacekeeping missions is increasing. On average, missions that started in the 1990s lasted 26 months compared to 50 months for missions authorized since 2000.⁷ This trend is a result of broader mandates that are increasingly concerned with rebuilding states after conflict, which demands long-term commitments. As highlighted in our third section, widely used indicators of effectiveness seem to be dominantly security focused. With conflict being the main concern for peace operations, improvements in terms of levels and intensity of violence will continue to be of primary importance. However, this focus on security misses an important aspect of the evolution of peace missions. Traditional peacekeeping operations were militarily demanding, but fewer peacekeeping mandates of the traditional type were seen. Most recent missions have multidimensional mandates that "include elements of longer-term postconflict economic, social, and political development or 'peacebuilding'" (Fortna & Howard, 2008). Figure 2 illustrates these changes by showing which tasks UN peacekeepers were mandated within each authorized mission from 1948 to 2015. The end of the Cold War resulted in a clear expansion of responsibilities for peace missions differently from the pre-1990s period, when missions were uniquely focused on military activities, ceasefire monitoring, and occasional assistance to governments.

Researchers are just beginning to focus on the long-term impacts of peacekeeping. Instead, evaluations of peacekeeping are framed in relation to absence of violence (negative peace) rather than building peaceful societies (positive peace). Conditions for economic, political, and social development are intertwined with this concept of positive peace and the importance of reducing the risks for future conflict. Regarding economic development, a few studies examine the contribution of peace missions to national and local economies. For example, Hoeffler et al. (2010) identify a positive but temporary (3-year) positive effect of peacekeeping mission on economic growth, but this is unexpectedly independent of mission size. The only published subnational study that captures the economic effect of peacekeeping is from Caruso et al. (2016), who show that stronger mission presence increases cereal production in South Sudan. While the results of this study are limited to the South Sudan, it is important to recall that complementary research highlights the distorting effect of peacekeeping at the local level through the establishment of so-called peacekeeping economies (Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović, 2009). While more rigorous empirical work on economic success of peacekeeping is ongoing, even less is known about its effect on other developmental outcomes such as infant mortality rates and human development.

Peacekeeping may reduce conflict and stop wars without creating conditions that reduce risk of recurrence. Political and economic exclusion of some groups, such as ethnic groups, have been shown to generate horizontal inequalities and thus increase the odds of violent mobilization (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). Establishing peace through negotiated settlements without removing those enabling conditions for civil war cannot reasonably produce durable peace. UN peacekeepers are mandated to assist governments in building new institutions and reforming existing ones. Indeed, steering democratic transition is one criterion of successful peacebuilding, according to the widely cited definition of Doyle and Sambanis (2000), but democratic transition does not equate to more equal societies. It remains unknown whether the changes in the polity score are due to improvements on procedural democracy or on indices of inclusiveness. Relatedly, persistence of inequalities is an important obstacle for potential returnees after conflicts have ceased. Refugees and internally displaced people often refrain from returning to their homes even if violence stops. It is possible that the presence of peacekeepers can reduce uncertainty and favor normalization, but this is only likely to occur under certain circumstances. For example, whether the UN contributed to war termination, negotiated a political agreement with power-sharing arrangements, or effectively protected civilians are reassuring pull-factors for refugees and internally displaced people. Future research should engage with peacekeeping's effects on these and other indicators. In this sense, the contribution of peacekeeping to the quality of peace in postconflict countries remains understudied in the quantitative literature. Notably, the peacekeeping literature is focused on negative peace (or the absence of violence) but this focus is, in turn, limited to conflict-related violence. Social violence (i.e., riots and violent protests), criminal violence, and terrorism are not accounted for in identifying peacekeeping's potential violence-reduction impact. These forms of violence may be less political and only tangentially related to the main conflict; however, they shape perceptions of safety among the local population. On balance, the empirical work on peace operations effectiveness has contributed to a robust foundation of cumulative knowledge on how and under what conditions negative peace lasts, civilians are protected, and belligerents stop fighting. However, further empirically grounded work is needed to understand whether the effectiveness of peace operations can be extended to major challenges such as encouraging refugees and internally displaced people to return home, providing stable polities, strengthening economies, and aiding in processes of social development.

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With more than 70 missions under its belt since it was formed in the mid-40s, the United Nations Peacekeepers have played a significant role in their quest to protect civilians and bring about peace in war-affected territories.

Burundi

Like its neighbour, Rwanda, Burundi was beset by a lengthy civil war that claimed more than 300,000 lives. The conflict, which dragged from 1993 to 2006, was caused by the age-old tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in the country. The war started after Burundi held its first-ever democratic election in 1993, precipitated by the assassination of the new president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, two months into office.

In 2001, the Burundian Government and the main rebel group signed the Arusha Accords to establish a Hutu-Tutsi power-sharing government. Despite the agreement, the conflict persisted. In response to the protracted war, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force in the East African country in 2004 to oversee the peace process and the 2005 presidential election. The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) consisted of more than 5,600 soldiers and ended in 2007.

Democratic Republic of Congo

The UN's first peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo ran from 1960 to 1964. Known as Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), the mission was created to help bring an end to the Congo Crisis, a period of conflict between 1960 and 1965. The second UN mission in the DRC began in 1999 and has been ongoing ever since. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or MONUSCO, was established to restore peace during the Second Congo War, which caused 5.4 million deaths. In relation to the magnitude of the DRC conflict, it's no wonder MONUSCO is the UN's largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the organisation's history.

The operation has seen the deployment of more than 19,000 troops and over 1,000 police in the Central African country. Contributions of military and police personnel come from more than thirty countries, with India being the largest contributor. The operation's current budget is set at US \$7.9 billion.

Eritrea and Ethiopia

The role of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), from 2000 to 2008, was to monitor a ceasefire in the border dispute between the two Horn of Africa nations. The war had begun in 1998 in the contested town of Badme, displacing about 250,000 Eritreans and killing about 80,000 people from both countries. With headquarters in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, the peacekeeping mission was made up of over 1,600 military personnel.

The UN also responded to the war by imposing a one-year arms embargo on both sides, banning all nations from selling or supplying the neighbouring countries with weapons, and from providing them with arms-related training. A peace deal signed in 2000 ended the two-year territorial war. After the end of the war, the UN formed the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which drew the border and established that the town of Badme belongs to Eritrea.

Angola

After Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, victory celebrations were short-lived thanks to the civil war that erupted due to a combination of ethnic and international issues. Beginning immediately after independence, the conflict was also a proxy war between Cold War opponents that interfered to back the different fighting sides. The war was a power struggle between two liberation parties, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the former, while South Africa and the United States backed the latter.

A UN operation (United Nations Angola Verification Mission I) was established in 1988 to oversee the withdrawal of the Cuban troops. Following the success of the mission, the world body launched a follow-up operation known as United Nations Angola Verification Mission II in 1991. The second mission, which ended in 1995, was created to monitor peace agreements and oversee the ceasefire of 1990.

Mozambique

Mozambique was plunged into a lengthy and crippling civil war between the government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), two years after the country gained independence from Portugal in 1975. It was also revealed that the war was supported by South Africa's infamous apartheid regime. After two years of negotiations in Rome, the two parties eventually signed a General Peace Agreement on the 4th of October, 1992. As part of the agreement, the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established to help implement the peace deal, as well as to monitor a ceasefire, the demobilisation of foreign forces, and the national electoral process.

Rwanda

Photo Credit: UN

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The Rwandan Civil War between the Rwandan Armed Forces (who were loyalists of the Hutu-dominated government), and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebel group comprising mostly of Rwandan Tutsi refugees, broke out in 1990. The conflict was catapulted by the former's invasion of the northeast part of the country. The carnage left by the three-year war resulted in several ceasefire agreements, most notably the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), at the request of both the Armed Forces and the Patriotic Front, was established to help implement the Agreement signed by the parties in 1993. The mission, who ran from 1993 to 1996, called for a democratically-elected government, in addition to the repatriation of refugees.

Chad and Central African Republic

The conflict in Darfur has forced over 240,000 Sudanese refugees and more than 45,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) to flee to Chad for safety. Civilians in eastern Chad, together with Darfurian refugees, lived in perpetual danger as armed rebel groups incessantly carry out attacks across the Sudanese border.

The UN sent peacekeeping troops to Chad and the Central African Republic in 2007 to protect civilians, promote human rights, and foster regional peace. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) initially consisted of 350 military and police personnel, but as the conflict continued, the UN Security Council sent more troops, bringing the number to 5,200 by 2010. Countries that contributed to the military personnel included, among others, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya.

Liberia

The First Liberian Civil War was an eight-year conflict that commenced 1989, leaving more than 600,000 dead in its wake. Fighting started when former government minister, Charles Taylor, moved to Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire to spearhead an uprising that intended to overturn Samuel Doe's allegedly crooked government.

The war led to the intervention of the UN and resulted in the establishment of The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1993. UNOMIL's roles were to aid in the implementation of peace agreements, to investigate ceasefire and human rights violations, as well as monitor the electoral process, among other matters.

The UN mission was launched after the regional group, Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), brokered a peace agreement between the warring sides, making UNOMIL the first UN peacekeeping operation established in cooperation with an already existing and similar mission by another organisation.

Sudan and South Sudan

Photo Credit: UN

The second Sudanese civil war, which began in 1983 to 2005, saw the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLMA) fight over power, resources, and the role of religion in the country. The war continued for 22 years, and claimed more than two million lives, while some 600,000 people were displaced as refugees.

The conflict ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the government of Sudan and the SPLM in 2005. The peace accord led to the creation of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which was tasked with supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, protecting and promoting human rights, and supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan.

As a result of the mission, up to 10,000 military personnel, including observers and police, were deployed in Sudan. UNMIS wrapped up on 9 July 2011, the same day South Sudan became an independent country.

Sierra Leone

Plagued by a civil war that lasted for eleven years, Sierra Leone was desperate for peace. An intervention was needed to help end the conflict that had begun in 1991 when the rebel group, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by former Liberian leader, Charles Taylor, launched attacks in an attempt to overthrow the government.

The West African country was only able to see peace with the assistance of foreign forces. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was formed to help with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord, an agreement intended to end the fighting.

The UN's mission in Sierra Leone is often described as one of the organisation's most successful peacekeeping operations. Among other things, the organisation's troops successfully "disarmed more than 75,000 ex-fighters, including hundreds of child soldiers. The UN destroyed more than 42 000 weapons and 1, 2 million rounds of ammunition a potentially deadly arsenal that is now itself dead," former Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, revealed about the mission.